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Will Disneyland Become Debt Land? How Much Can Thailand Handle? Global Standards for Country Selection Beyond Government Funds and Available Land

Marketing & trends14 Jan 2026 15:04 GMT+7

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Will Disneyland Become Debt Land? How Much Can Thailand Handle? Global Standards for Country Selection Beyond Government Funds and Available Land

"The idea of attracting Disneyland" to Thailand was officially put on the table on 8 Jan 2026 by Phiphat Ratchakitprakarn, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Transport, as a leader of the Bhumjaithai Party, aiming to accelerate infrastructure projects in the EEC area, such as the high-speed rail linking three airports and the development of U-Tapao Airport and the Eastern Aviation City. This initiative also aims to position Thailand with a new global competitive "Man-Made Destination." “Man-Made Destination” competing on a global level.

Why is the Thai government interested in Disneyland Thailand, and where did the idea come from?

From Phiphat’s statements, the key point is that building a world-class sports complex to host international events, previously discussed with the Sports Authority of Thailand—including indoor arenas with 30,000 seats, an 80,000-seat football stadium, and Olympic-standard swimming pools—is necessary but not a daily crowd puller. Hence, the idea of building a Disneyland was brought up.

Phiphat said that the high-speed rail project linking Don Mueang, Suvarnabhumi, and U-Tapao airports and the development of U-Tapao Airport and the Eastern Aviation City are not economically viable on their own. Moreover, the EEC has large available land areas that the Eastern Economic Corridor Office (EECO) plans to develop, so it just needs new selling points to be added.

After presenting this idea last year, some Thai investors have shown preliminary interest but remain undisclosed. He confirmed that discussions with EECO regarding attracting Disneyland to Thailand have been completed, and the government is moving towards formal project proposals.

Phiphat added that Thailand holds advantages in land area, project scale, tourism and service costs, especially its central location in the region and ready transportation infrastructure connecting these areas. Tourists can arrive at Suvarnabhumi or U-Tapao airports and take high-speed rail to the park within hours, then travel onward to other domestic destinations.

In this context, Disneyland Thailand would not just be an amusement park but a strategic move to revive stalled infrastructure projects in the EEC, which have been stagnant for over five years. The idea hopes to support two key projects: the three-airport high-speed rail (Don Mueang-Suvarnabhumi-U-Tapao) and the development of U-Tapao Airport and the Eastern Aviation City. These projects would proceed with construction and make it easier for private investors to commit further investments.

If Disneyland comes to Thailand, what form will it take? What is the investment value in hundreds of billions?

Two approaches were revealed on 8 January:

  • Inviting Disney to invest directly, with the Thai government offering land and infrastructure and partnering with Thai private investors.
  • If Disney does not invest directly, Thailand could acquire licensing rights to develop the project under the Disney brand, similar to some global theme park models.

According to data Phiphat cited, a small Disneyland covers about 960 rai, a medium-sized one about 1,800-2,000 rai, and a large park around 3,000 rai. Combining this with earlier ideas to build a flexible sports complex for international conferences, the total area might reach around 5,000 rai—larger thanShanghai Disney Resort,which in China covers approximately 2,435 rai with an investment of 5.5 billion USD, or about 175.45 billion baht.

Based on proportional investment, Thailand might require 7 to 8 billion USD, roughly 256 to 292 billion baht, for a 3,000-rai world-class theme park meeting international standards, excluding current higher construction costs.

Though no specific province is named, based on all conditions, this Disneyland would be within the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC), which includes Chonburi, Rayong, Chachoengsao, and Chanthaburi provinces, with Chonburi widely expected as the prime candidate.

Currently, The Walt Disney Company operates 12 Disneyland and related parks across six major resorts worldwide:

United States

- Disneyland Park (California)

- Disney California Adventure (California)

- Magic Kingdom (Florida)

- EPCOT (Florida)

- Disney’s Hollywood Studios (Florida)

- Disney’s Animal Kingdom (Florida)

Japan
- Tokyo Disneyland
- Tokyo DisneySea

France
- Disneyland Park (Paris)
- Walt Disney Studios Park (Paris)

China and Hong Kong
- Shanghai Disney Resort (Shanghai)
- Hong Kong Disneyland (Hong Kong)

Currently, Disney is building Disneyland Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates, which will be the first Disney resort in the Middle East and the seventh worldwide, expected to open around early 2030. Notably, there is no Disney park in ASEAN yet. Therefore, if the Thai government can successfully bring Disneyland or a Disney-branded park to Thailand, it would be the first in the ASEAN region.

How much economic transformation could this bring? Lessons from the U.S. and the big questions for Thailand.

Since Disneyland's debut in the U.S. 70 years ago, the brand has achieved success both as a business and cultural icon, exemplifying the modern theme park industry and becoming a powerful economic engine in the United States.

Disney Parks & Resortsgenerate an economic value of 67 billion USD, or about 2.3 trillion baht annually, supporting over 403,000 jobs directly and indirectly across California, Florida, and all 50 U.S. states.

This figure reflects that Disneyland's revenue is not limited to ticket sales but drives an entire economic ecosystem including hotels, accommodations, restaurants, transportation, suppliers, and local services, generating substantial tax revenues for local and national governments.

Based on the U.S. model, the positive impact expected in Thailand includes direct investments worth hundreds of billions of baht, substantial long-term employment, increased high-spending tourists seeking experiences, surrounding area development, utilization of existing public infrastructure, and enhanced national image globally.

At this point, the question many Thais hope for is whether Thailand will be chosen, whether it is ready to host Disneyland, and how prepared Thailand is for this level of theme park business model.

Disney's expansion in Asia does not follow a single formula; each location reflects strategic considerations of its time, including laws and economic conditions that influence the risk level of control and cultural adaptation.

1) Tokyo Disneyland: The Licensing Model Tokyo Disneyland(opened 1983) was the first Disney park outside the U.S. and the only one not owned by Disney itself but operated under a licensing model.

  • Structure: Oriental Land Co., Ltd. (OLC), a Japanese investment group, owns and manages 100%.
  • Agreement: Disney invested nothing but licensed its characters (IP) and designs in exchange for royalties of about 10% of admission fees and 5% of food and merchandise sales.
  • Result: The park generated enormous revenue and profit, leading Disney to prefer joint venture models for subsequent projects.

2) Hong Kong Disneyland: Public-Private Partnership Model Hong Kong Disneyland(opened 2005) adopted a joint venture model with the local government to stimulate the economy.

  • Structure: The Walt Disney Company owns 47%, the Hong Kong government 53%, with management by Hong Kong International Theme Parks Limited (HKITP).
  • Agreement: The Hong Kong government invested heavily in land reclamation and support, while Disney managed branding and operations, moving from only licensing fees to sharing profits and losses as a shareholder.
  • Result: Though the smallest park, it is strategically important in attracting premium tourists in Southeast Asia due to its proximity. This model shows how theme park expansion can become a political issue because of required government budgets.

3) Shanghai Disney Resort: Modified Joint Venture Model Shanghai Disney Resort(opened 2016) is the most complex model to comply with Chinese laws, splitting ownership and management into two main parts:

  • Structure
    • Asset Owners:
      Shanghai Shendi Group: 57% (a Chinese state-owned enterprise)
      The Walt Disney Company: 43%
    • Management Company:
      The Walt Disney Company: 70%
      Shanghai Shendi Group: 30%
  • Agreement: This structure allows Disney to maintain full operational control despite minority ownership of assets, ensuring service standards and creative direction.
  • Result: This model enabled rapid success for a newcomer, blending Disney identity with Chinese culture intensely, and is recognized as one of Asia's largest and most advanced modern theme parks.
  • From the perspective of a global brand like Disney, attractive location and visitor numbers alone are not the final decision factors. Although Thailand ranks among top tourism hubs with land, resources, and a reputation for service, lessons from Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Shanghai show Disney selects countries based on “structural readiness.”

    Disney conducts multi-dimensional strategic assessments to ensure multi-billion-dollar investments yield returns over more than 50 years, balancing the Disneyland brand identity with local culture.

    What Thailand still needs to "fill in" to attract Disneyland

    1. A strong domestic market, not solely reliant on foreign tourists.

    Disneyland cannot rely mainly on international tourists but needs repeat visitors from domestic and nearby regional markets. Thailand's challenge is a fragile middle class with premium entertainment spending not yet a core household behavior, limiting repeat visits for "experience" over casual tourism, unlike Japan or China. To serve as a Disneyland base, Thailand must prove its domestic market can support sustained spending beyond peak seasons.

    2. Policy stability.

    Disney views investments over 50 years, so political risk is as important as returns. Thailand must ensure policy continuity, legal clarity, land ownership rights, incentives, and regulation, especially the ability to uphold agreements across governments. From a global investor’s view, such uncertainties are invisible costs that heavily impact decisions.

    3. Systematic infrastructure.

    Thailand must prove its mass transit can handle tens of thousands daily, with seamless connections between airports, high-speed rail, roads, hotels, and surrounding cities. The management of adjacent areas must avoid fragmented growth, as Disney values the city around the park as much as the park itself. Hence, clear EEC infrastructure plans are a major urgent issue.

    4. Labor and service systems.

    Disneyland is a high-level service business measured by second-level details and smiles. Thailand has strengths in hospitality but must elevate its workforce to consistent standards nationwide, build a uniform service culture, support large-scale long-term labor, and provide training and development systems.

    5. Clear investment model.

    Disney uses various models in Asia, from licensing in Japan to joint ventures in China. Thailand must clarify who leads, the government's role, and whether Thai private sectors can take on multi-billion-dollar risks. Without clear structure, interest is unlikely to translate into contracts.

    For Thailand, the Disneyland deal cannot be seen merely as selling an idea or inviting wealthy investors to invest. This represents a large gap across multiple sectors yet to be discussed. Thailand must urgently reassess national readiness to elevate systems to be chosen. If successful, Disneyland will move beyond a symbolic dream to become a concrete, significant piece—not just government imagination.



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