Assoc. Prof. Dr. Piti points out that Section 26 does not directly cause higher electricity prices, but its constraints that do not align with the actual conditions of petroleum fields may delay decisions, disrupt domestic gas production, and increase reliance on imported gas. He suggests revising the law to allow the state to choose solutions per field, considering legal, engineering, and economic aspects, while disclosing criteria for public scrutiny.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Piti Iamjamroonlap, a lecturer at the Faculty of Law, Chulalongkorn University, said that the electricity bills people receive each month may not start from what happens at the power plants alone but can trace back to decisions made years ago regarding natural gas fields and to the constraints of just one petroleum law provision.
The provision in question is Section 26 of the Petroleum Act B.E. 2514 (1971), which sets the production timeframe under concession contracts and allows only a single extension of up to 10 years. The specifics of each concession generation may differ depending on the laws and conditions at the time the concession was granted.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Piti further explained that the issue is not the law setting concession durations because national resources must be under state oversight within a timeframe. The key limitation is that once the legal extension rights are fully used, the state may lack sufficient flexibility to manage fields that still contain petroleum and can be economically produced further.
Each petroleum field differs; some may have limited remaining resources and should enter decommissioning, while others could continue producing if additional investment is made, suitable technology is used, or conditions are adjusted to increase state benefits. Applying a one-size-fits-all approach does not align with facts regarding resource volume, system readiness, investment cost, and national returns.
Section 26 itself does not determine electricity rates, and amending the law will not immediately lower electricity bills. The connection arises when legal constraints prevent the state from timely decisions on end-of-life petroleum fields. Delayed decisions may discourage existing operators from further investment due to insufficient remaining time to justify costs. Changing operators also requires time for selection, asset transfer, staffing, and new production planning.
This unprepared transition can reduce or disrupt domestic natural gas production capacity, creating a production gap. This does not mean Thailand will immediately lack gas but that supply from existing fields will decline faster than new fields or operators can compensate.
When domestic gas is insufficient, Thailand may need to increase imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to maintain continuous electricity supply. LNG costs depend on global market prices, exchange rates, and international conditions, making them more volatile and harder to control than domestic resources.
Higher fuel costs may reflect in the variable electricity tariff (Ft), then affect costs for factories, transport businesses, shops, and service providers, eventually showing up in consumer goods prices and people's cost of living. However, such impacts do not occur automatically because electricity prices also depend on other factors.
These factors include fuel mix, global energy prices, exchange rates, and government measures. The key point is not to claim that Section 26 causes higher electricity prices but to highlight that if legal constraints delay gas field management, energy cost risks may increase.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Piti believes that legal reforms should not be interpreted as automatically granting original concessionaires extension rights but should provide the state with tools to compare options and select the most beneficial approach for the country in each case.
Decisions should consider at least three dimensions together: legal, regarding the state's authority and procedures; engineering, regarding how much longer the field can produce and required investments; and economic, regarding which option yields the greatest return for the state and people.
Possible options include allowing the existing operator to continue under new conditions, opening competition to select a new operator, or terminating production and proceeding with decommissioning, depending on each field's facts.
If allowing the existing operator to continue, the state must clearly define new conditions, including investment plans, production targets, state benefits, decommissioning responsibilities, and environmental measures. If choosing competition, the process must start sufficiently early to avoid production disruptions during operator transitions.
Importantly, increased legal flexibility must come with transparency guarantees. The state should disclose evaluation criteria, comparison methods, decision timelines, and reasons for choosing a particular approach so society can verify that decisions protect national interests rather than favor any operator.
The challenge of Section 26 is not simply whether to extend concessions but whether Thailand has laws enabling timely state decisions and appropriate solutions tailored to each field.
And whether remaining resources are used to maximize benefits. Because if decisions are too delayed, costs may extend beyond petroleum fields, passing through the electricity system, production sector, and goods prices before ultimately impacting people's wallets.