Election Commission officials booed reporters asking whether barcoded ballots reveal who voted for whom. Worapong Anantcharoenkij affirmed that no data leaks occur and explained that the EC sets the ballot printing format but it depends on each printing house. He pointed out that no one can verify voter choices by comparing ballot stubs with ballots.
On 13 Feb 2026 GMT+7 at the Election Commission office, Worapong Anantcharoenkij, Director of the Election Support Bureau, told the media that this election and referendum use three types of ballots printed by three different printing houses to meet deadlines. Security and verification measures vary according to each printer’s technology and techniques. For referendum ballots without QR or barcodes, he confirmed tracking systems exist but details cannot be disclosed.
Regarding sample ballots previously released without barcodes, Worapong explained these samples were created solely to publicize the ballot design. Since QR or barcodes are security measures, they cannot be included on sample ballots.
Meanwhile, Lt. Pasakorn Siriphakyaporn, Deputy Secretary-General of the Election Commission, added that election documents—including ballot stubs, ballots, and voter lists—are stored separately, making it impossible to identify where a ballot came from or who cast it. Although some may wonder if polling officials can see ballot numbers, vote counting is done publicly with observers and party representatives verifying the process. Valid, spoiled, and blank ballots are separated and systematically stored. Individual ballots cannot be photographed or scanned to identify voters, and voting is confidential, so polling officials cannot know who voted for whom.
When asked if scanning a barcode showing a unique number could trace back to the stub and reveal the voter, Worapong clarified that although scanning reveals the ballot number, it is practically impossible to know individual voting results due to multiple security layers from voting, counting, to secure storage, and strict prohibitions against unauthorized opening.
When questioned about potential conflicts with the constitutional principle of secret ballots, Lt. Pasakorn explained that “secret” means voters cast ballots without anyone knowing their choices, and current procedures fully comply with this principle.
Election Commission officials booed reporters asking whether barcoded ballots reveal who voted for whom.
Reporters further asked if it was possible to match ballot stubs with ballots and barcodes to identify voters, requesting a simple yes or no. Worapong responded that ballot boxes and stubs are stored collectively at the electoral district level, each district having about 250 units, sometimes over 1,000 per province, making tracing difficult. Moreover, unauthorized opening of ballot boxes is illegal.
Pressed whether “unlikely” means impossible, Worapong said that anyone attempting this would have fraudulent intent and face legal penalties. When asked if matching would be possible if such tampering occurred, some officials booed the media during questioning before EC staff intervened and restored order.
Confirming that ballots contain barcodes as seen online, Worapong assured that no data leakage has occurred.
Later, when asked if numbers or barcodes circulating on social media could leak personal data, Worapong insisted individuals cannot be identified since these numbers are not linked to voter information.
Regarding why QR and barcodes are used for tracking or fraud detection, and whether other methods exist, Worapong said the 2023 district elections also used QR codes. The EC employs other anti-fraud methods depending on each printer’s processes and technology. Due to limited printing time, each printer uses different technologies but all enable fraud detection. Ballots appearing on social media fall into two cases: ballots still attached in units, and ballots revealed during counting. The owner did not share these, so they bear no fault.
He noted that printing of ballot and book numbers depends on each printing house's method.
Asked if the EC designs the ballots for printing houses and whether referendum ballots without QR or barcodes risk data leakage, Worapong said that although referendum ballots lack these codes, anti-fraud measures exist but cannot be disclosed. The use of ballot and book numbers depends on each printer. Barcodes or QR codes are scanned only when ballots cross units or districts to verify allocation, detecting anomalies if numbers and districts don’t match. Such incidents have never occurred.
Ballot stubs and ballots are stored separately, making it impossible for anyone to verify voter identity.
Regarding claims by MP Viroj Lakkanaadisorn of the People’s Party requesting verification that ballot stubs match ballot codes, and concerns about secrecy if only the EC knows the system, Lt. Pasakorn stated that stubs and ballots are kept separately and cannot be cross-checked. He emphasized no one can inspect ballots except in cases of fraud, which would be investigated based on facts.