The Transport Committee summoned relevant parties to discuss the train-bus collision, revealing a detailed timeline of the critical five seconds before the fatal accident. Meanwhile, the State Railway of Thailand (SRT) explained that the positions of signs and signal poles comply with regulations. The Director-General of the Department of Rail Transport countered, stating that a 100-meter braking distance is insufficient to stop the train.
At 09:00 on 20 May 2026 at the Parliament, the House of Representatives' Transport Committee, chaired by MP Suphanat Meenachainan of the People's Party, convened to examine the case of freight train No. 2126 crashing into the orange air-conditioned bus line 206 (Por. 206). The committee invited key officials for clarification: Mr. Pichet Kunathamrak, Director-General of the Department of Rail Transport; Mr. Thayakorn Chantrangsuk, Director of Safety Standards and Track Maintenance Division, Department of Rail Transport; Mr. Cheep Nomsian, Deputy Director-General of the Department of Land Transport; Mr. Anan Phonimdaeng, Acting Governor of the State Railway of Thailand (SRT); Mr. Kittikarn Jomduang and Jaruworaphonkul, Directors of the Bangkok Mass Transit Authority (BMTA); Police Major General Thawat Wongsanga, Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Bureau; Police Colonel Kamphon Rattanaprateep, Deputy Commander of Police Station 1; and Police Colonel Uramphon Khundetsamrit, Superintendent of Makkasan Police Station.
MP Suphanat inquired about CCTV footage to review during the meeting, but Superintendent of Makkasan Police Station explained that the footage is evidence in the investigation and cannot be disclosed. He added that the images circulated in the media are unknown to him and confirmed they did not come from the police. Director-General Pichet Kunathamrak revealed that after the incident, evidence was collected and coordinated with investigators. An official committee was appointed to verify facts and find ways to improve safety. The committee will hold hearings tomorrow afternoon (21 May). The Department of Rail Transport has filed complaints against those responsible due to fatalities and numerous injuries, and will submit a report to the committee later.
Mr. Thayakorn, Director of the Safety Standards and Track Maintenance Division, Department of Rail Transport, explained the second-by-second sequence of events based on CCTV: At 15:35:01, staff waved a red flag; at 15:35:24, the staff removed the red flag while vehicles were passing, with the bus involved seen on the tracks. At 15:35:39, the staff waved a flag near the station booth, presumed to be reaching through the booth window to control the barrier and signal permissions indicating whether a train can proceed. It is assumed the staff attempted to press a button. At 15:35:44, the train arrived, and the staff was seen standing with their back turned, unaware the train was breaching the signal. At 15:35:45, the train crashed into the bus, causing sparks; at 15:35:47, a fire broke out; at 15:35:48, the bus was dragged by the train. At 15:35:52, staff were seen near the rear of the locomotive, likely maintenance personnel. At 15:36:00, the train stopped.
MP Suphanat asked if pressing the button means only five seconds passed between the button press and the train reaching the booth. He inquired whether there are other ways to provide advance warning. He also asked if the earlier signal at about 50 meters was the same as the light system or if there were signals farther away, since braking distances have been debated—some say 200 meters, others 2 kilometers. If the signal is only 50 meters away, braking in time would be impossible.
Mr. Anan Phonimdaeng, Acting Governor of the State Railway of Thailand, explained that the signal pole is positioned 50 meters away because the SRT currently follows the 2006 regulations, which stipulate various rules such as railway signal positions, hand signals from stationmasters or crossing guards as reported in the news. These are all enforced by the SRT. Although the pole is 50 meters away, there must be a visibility distance of 500 meters. This position is not where the train driver operates from. He confirmed that the placement of signs and signal poles complies with regulations and supports the train's braking requirements fully.
Regarding whether there is a signal or barrier gate at the location, the railway crossing gates are of two types: manually controlled and automatic. The accident site is a large traffic lane where automatic gates cannot be used.
The Acting Governor of SRT clarified about braking: the train's load excluding the cars is 1,136 tons. The route is an urban zone with speed limits imposed by the railway. The maximum speed permitted at the accident site is 40 kilometers per hour. Speed data will be provided to the police for the case file. The train departed Khlong Tan at 40 km/h, passing through the crossing continuously at an average speed of 30–35 km/h. At 118 meters before the accident, the speed was 34 km/h, with a deceleration likely due to an emergency brake, reducing speed to 28 km/h. At the collision point, the speed was zero, about 80 meters from the accident site.
Director-General Pichet Kunathamrak added that for a 20-container freight train weighing 1,100 tons, stopping within 100 meters is unrealistic. He said, "If we imagine standing on the tracks and trying to stop this train, it would feel extremely unsafe." Theoretically, stopping is possible, but in reality, emergency brakes must be used, which are not applied continuously. When trains stop, braking distance and the use of emergency brakes pose risks of derailment. Therefore, emergency brakes are reserved for unavoidable collisions and are not standard procedure. Normally, braking is gradual to prevent derailment.
The Director-General said that freight trains normally run at 60 km/h, but within Bangkok they run slower. He emphasized the need to scientifically verify actual braking distances. While theory suggests certain distances, in practice the department regulates safe braking distances rather than theoretical ones, prioritizing safety. Braking must be gradual; otherwise, derailment risk increases. The locomotive is 30 years old, and brake carriages vary in condition, each weighing 18 tons multiplied by 20 carriages. The locomotive itself weighs over 80 tons. Braking commands travel sequentially from the locomotive to each carriage, not simultaneously, taking several seconds. This must be accounted for in safety distances.
"Theoretically or as debated on social media about stopping distances, one can test this by asking ChatGPT or having high school students calculate whether stopping within 100 or 200 meters is feasible. However, the Department of Rail Transport prioritizes public safety above all. Therefore, braking systems must be measured in kilometers, not 100 meters. Even cars cannot reliably stop within 100 meters," he said.
MP Suphanat asked a technical question: if a train were to stop at a station 35 kilometers ahead, at what kilometer mark would braking begin? The Acting Governor of SRT explained that trains have various braking distances depending on weight. SRT safety officials set a standard braking distance of 1,000 meters, requiring that signal poles be visible with added time for decision-making. Emergency braking, in the worst case, must occur within 750 meters.