Phokin and Somkiat urge a complete overhaul of the independent agency selection system to enhance public oversight. They advise the Election Commission to send the Senate election collusion case to the courts for adjudication, warning that closing the case amid lingering doubts could be seen as failing to fulfill its role as a watchdog agency.
On 12 September 2026, the Parliamentary Committee on Courts, Independent Agencies, Prosecutors, State Enterprises, Public Organizations, and Funds held a seminar titled "Monitoring the Role of Independent Agencies Amid Thailand's Political Crisis" at the Parliament Building. The morning session featured keynote speeches by Chuan Leekpai, a party-list MP from the Democrat Party and former Prime Minister; Phokin Pholkul, former Parliament Speaker; and Somkiat Tangkitvanich, President of the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI).
At one point, Phokin stated that the problems of independent agencies cannot be separated from Thailand's political structure, which over 94 years has revolved around coups, rewriting constitutions, and elections under newly imposed rules. This structure is based on authoritarianism, patronage, and bureaucracy, causing agencies meant to oversee power to be drawn into the same system.
Although independent agencies under the 1997 Constitution were designed to create a system of checks and balances, political factions and those in power have tried to control these oversight bodies. As a result, mechanisms meant to be independent may become tools of those in power. Changes in the origins and structure of independent agencies over time have not resolved structural problems and often merely shifted control from one faction to another.
The issue is not simply whether independent agencies exist or not, because if the political power structure remains unchanged, the outcomes are similar. Especially when oversight bodies apply differing evidence or standards and are themselves difficult to scrutinize, there is a need for a public oversight mechanism. Phokin suggested reviving the principle from the 1997 Constitution allowing 50,000 citizens to petition for the removal of officials in independent agencies and constitutional courts, so that agencies with oversight power can themselves be held accountable by the public.
Phokin also proposed establishing a civil society-based anti-corruption commission working alongside the official National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), composed of professional organization representatives and regional public appointees. This would provide more avenues for public complaints and corruption oversight, rather than relying solely on the constitutional agency. Long-term solutions require strengthening civil society to check state and oversight agency power, because democracy should not stop at rhetoric about integrity or good governance but must enable citizens to participate in monitoring and combating misuse of power.
Somkiat stated that independent agencies remain necessary in a democracy because the traditional separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches alone is insufficient to prevent power consolidation, corruption, or misuse of political power. Thus, the concept arose for independent agencies to act as guardians of democracy, upholding rules and preventing political overreach.
The greatest challenge is balancing independence with accountability. If independent agencies have extensive power without being subject to oversight, they risk becoming “independent states” exercising excessive authority, potentially destroying democracy rather than protecting it. Experience from many countries shows that the political environment is as important as agency design. If the political system is dominated by one faction, independent agencies are vulnerable to interference or use as instruments against opponents. Therefore, good design should not concentrate oversight power in any single agency but create a network capable of mutual checks.
In Thailand, the 2017 Constitution’s structure is vulnerable because of at least two critical flaws: the centralized selection process for independent agencies, which is almost identical across agencies, and the role of the Senate as a key gatekeeper approving appointments to many independent agencies, including some constitutional court judges.
Somkiat also said that if a new constitution is drafted, it should diversify selection methods for independent agencies to avoid a single point of failure that could topple the entire system. It should also provide multiple channels for removing and scrutinizing agency commissioners. Moreover, independent agencies must cultivate a culture of accountability—not just declaring responsibility but being willing to disclose information, answer public questions, explain decisions, and face sanctions when misusing power.
In closing, Somkiat noted that part of the Election Commission’s credibility crisis stems from insufficient transparency, avoiding public questioning, and failing to explain decisions in many cases, especially regarding Senate appointments. Regarding allegations of fraud in the Senate election, he said the Election Commission should submit the case to the courts for open hearings, allowing the court to set standards distinguishing normal political grouping from conspiracy or corruption. If the Election Commission closes the case without court review despite significant doubts, it may be seen as failing in its role as a proper watchdog agency.
