Rangsit Rome thoroughly explains the sequence of investigating money trails related to gambling websites, pointing out that platforms must strictly blacklist suspicious wallets to prompt investigative agencies. He warns that if the government continues to ignore or delay action, it will only heighten public suspicion.
25 Oct 2026 GMT+7 Rangsit Rome Member of Parliament (MP) via party-list system and Deputy Leader of the People's Party, serving as Chair of the House Committee on Law, Justice, and Human Rights, posted a message onFacebookregarding the investigation into Ms. Suchada Sang Thanthap (Idea) MP for Chaiyaphum Province from the Bhumjaithai Party, her husband, and the online gambling website Shuffle. Recently, revelations emerged about financial links between Shuffle and Thai cryptocurrency trading platforms such as Bitkub and Maxbit. Some expressed concern these claims unfairly accuse the platforms mentioned. The explanation follows in order:
1. The financial connection between Shuffle and Thai crypto platforms, combined with the fact that the Shuffle website was accessible from Thailand until recently, listed Thailand as a playable country, and showed advertisements visible in Thailand, at minimum demonstrates that gambling offenses partially occurred within the Kingdom of Thailand. This may also involve money laundering, as gambling is classified as a predicate offense under the Anti-Money Laundering Act. The cyber police, responsible authorities, have confirmed this to me during the committee meeting. The offenders at this stage are the Shuffle service providers themselves and possibly related beneficiaries.
2. Regarding the Thai cryptocurrency platforms linked financially to Shuffle, generally, one must presume the platform providers are not legally culpable. However, the following points warrant consideration:
2.1 Cryptocurrency is an increasingly popular tool for moving funds within criminal networks. Such movements often become apparent only after retrospective data collection. Ignoring the likelihood of criminal networks using cryptocurrency, or dismissing this as no different from other financial channels while citing many technical reasons, hinders effective crime prevention and suppression. This harms the cryptocurrency user community itself.
2.2 For the reasons in 2.1, cryptocurrency platform providers have a duty to rigorously monitor and block users from conducting illegal transactions on their platforms—for example, by tracking direct and indirect financial routes and blacklisting suspicious wallets to deny credit to dubious transactions. To be fair, some platforms providing information to the committee have made such efforts, underscoring that these platforms have the capacity to prevent and address these issues.
2.3 Although current disclosed information does not confirm that crypto platforms are legally at fault, if further evidence shows that platforms knew or should have known about gambling or money laundering transactions passing through them and failed to take proper measures to stop it, legal consequences must be considered.
3. The responsible agencies—such as the Ministry of Digital Economy and Society, cyber police, and the Stock Exchange—must investigate whether platforms were intentionally used for laundering gambling money or were complicit. These agencies have the authority, responsibility, and tools to conduct such investigations. The question is: have they acted yet? If not, why, and when will they? Continued government neglect or delay will only deepen public doubts about platform providers, suggesting possible hidden agendas or collusion with the government. Simply put, the more seriously, swiftly, and transparently the government acts, the better it is for honest private operators.