The Political Development Committee questioned the Pegasus Spyware issue, with government agencies confirming there has been no budget for license renewal since 2020. Meanwhile, Lisa Phakmon expressed disappointment over the stalled discussions and lack of protective measures for citizens against surveillance, planning a confidential meeting for further inquiry.
On 12 November 2026, the Committee on Political Development, Mass Communication, and Public Participation, chaired by Ms. Phakmon Noon-on, a party-list MP from the Prachachon Party, convened to study facts regarding the procurement and use of Pegasus Spyware by government agencies, as well as impacts on political rights, freedom of expression, and citizen participation. Several related agencies attended to provide clarifications.
Ms. Sasinan Thammanithinan, Bangkok MP for District 11 from the Prachachon Party, and Associate Professor Phuangthong Phawakraphan, invited to the meeting, questioned the Narcotics Suppression Bureau’s spyware purchase in 2014 and raised concerns about budget documents for 2024–2026 from the Royal Thai Police showing allocations ranging from 160 to 350 million baht for renewing licenses of mobile phone interception and data collection equipment.
Representatives from the Royal Thai Police confirmed that currently, the police neither possess nor use Pegasus spyware or any other surveillance software. They acknowledged that in 2014 they purchased software solely for drug enforcement missions but have not received budget approval to renew licenses since 2020, thus no continued use to present.
Ms. Yanisa Thaisaming, a military committee academician, and Ms. Chonlatat Koykul, Bangkok MP for District 28 from the Prachachon Party, questioned a Citizen Lab report from Canada stating that Thailand used Circles spyware in three agencies: the Military Intelligence Office, the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), and the Narcotics Suppression Bureau. They also inquired about ISOC’s procurement of an Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) system featuring person location tracking and target relationship analysis.
ISOC representatives confirmed that investigations found no use of Pegasus or Circles spyware currently or in the past. Regarding the OSINT project, they said details were unavailable but assured ISOC’s mission is to assist citizens, not to surveil individuals.
Ms. Chonlatat asked the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) about the scope of intelligence technology use and accountability if such technology is employed to track individuals for political reasons. The NIA affirmed compliance with the 2019 National Intelligence Act, Section 6, which prohibits violating personal rights. They have never budgeted or secretly purchased Pegasus or any spyware, considering the cost excessive and unjustified. Their cyber framework is solely for protecting their own intelligence systems, not for public surveillance.
Ms. Chonlatat further questioned the National Cybersecurity Committee (NCC) on its capability to detect Pegasus spyware. The NCC explained that detecting Zero-Day spyware is difficult due to lack of Indicators of Compromise (IOC). However, if data is sent back to servers located in Thailand, it can be traced retroactively.
Representatives of the National Human Rights Commission stated they have received over 35–40 complaints since 2021 from individuals alerted by Apple about potential state surveillance. Joint investigations with Citizen Lab and Apple’s lawsuit against NSO Group confirm Pegasus spyware sales only to government agencies. The Commission submitted recommendations to the Cabinet in June 2024 to investigate and establish regulatory laws.
Mr. Anusorn Kaewwichian, Nonthaburi MP for District 3 from the Prachachon Party, noted that about ten years ago he reviewed contracts for spyware purchases from an Israeli company by government agencies, which stipulated use solely for security missions and required court approval each time.
Mr. Seksit Yamsanguansak, Bangkok MP for District 2 from the Prachachon Party, explained he was surveilled by spyware in 2022 during his activism and social movements. Apple’s alert confirmed a state-sponsored attack. He questioned how security agencies have investigated the perpetrators over the past five years.
Ms. Phakmon asked the Ministry of Digital Economy and Society (MDES) why no security agency claimed to be the lead in investigating spyware and protecting citizens. She suggested MDES should take responsibility. She also asked whether proactive measures had begun to check the Cabinet after ministers said the Cabinet or Prime Minister might have been surveilled, and how prepared the ministry is with a clear timeline to lead citizen protection.
The MDES responded that the Prime Minister ordered the National Security Council meeting to assign MDES to oversee this matter. The minister is in ongoing discussions and developing measures. On 11 November, MDES and the NCC met with Apple, which recommended at-risk users enable Lockdown Mode. This week, MDES will meet with platforms like Google, AWS, telecom providers, and the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission to develop spyware traffic filtering methods and will provide progress updates.
Ms. Phakmon concluded the meeting explaining that media recording was allowed due to the direct impact and benefit to the public, who do not know when they might become targets. She emphasized the sincere intention to have all government agencies take responsibility and reassure citizens that officials and representatives protect them. Regarding confidentiality issues, the committee may hold additional closed meetings after MDES and the Prime Minister clarify policies.
Ms. Phakmon added she was disappointed that the meeting did not produce concrete protective measures for citizens. She noted that politicians, whether opposition or government, can assess political risks normally, but surveillance threats are unpredictable and do not clearly come from any side, reflecting serious insecurity. She stressed the committee’s concern is not about politicians who have better protections but about how ordinary citizens can have their fundamental rights safeguarded by any agency, despite understanding limitations on revealing confidential information.
