Five predicted formulas for government formation isolate the opposition in the post-2026 election power game. An academic analysis suggests the "five-star" formula is most likely, while the leading roles of the Pheu Thai and Prachachon parties remain uncertain and depend on key variables.
The general election scheduled for Sunday, 8 February 2026, is becoming a significant milestone in Thai politics amid unchanged rules and uncertainty about the power dynamics after the election. The main questions now are not only which party will get the most votes but also who will form the government and the direction Thai politics will take.
Given this context, society and political circles are closely monitoring the situation, with growing discussion and predictions about "government formation formulas"—which parties will ally after the election and how the political power structure will be organized.
Thairath Online's special report consulted Associate Professor Dr. Yutthaporn Isarachai from the Faculty of Political Science at Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University. He analyzed five possible government formation scenarios after the 2026 election, based on current political data and trends ahead of the vote.
Formula 1: Bhumjaithai leads government formation with Pheu Thai, Kla Party, and other smaller parties supporting. Associate Professor Dr. Yutthaporn sees this as the most likely scenario, expecting around 350 seats, which might be called the "five-star formula."
Formula 2: Pheu Thai becomes the government leader with Kla Party and medium and small parties as coalition partners. However, this is considered unlikely since it is projected to gain only about 190 seats, less than half of the 500-seat House of Representatives, insufficient to form a government.
Formula 3: The "Alliance Formula" where the Prachachon Party joins forces with Pheu Thai. This coalition might have about 230 seats, still under half unless supported by additional parties. The Prachachon Party has proposed this idea, suggesting combined votes could reach half, but Associate Professor Dr. Yutthaporn believes this scenario is less likely.
Formula 4: The "Anti-Red Coalition" includes all parties except Pheu Thai, which would be left in opposition. Even if Prachachon wins the most seats, the government leadership is likely to go to Bhumjaithai. This formula could gather more than 300 seats, making it possible but less likely than Formula 1.
Formula 5: The "Surrounding the Red Table" formula is a coalition between Prachachon and Bhumjaithai, leaving smaller parties to side with Pheu Thai. Although Prachachon would be the top party, the government leadership would likely remain with Bhumjaithai.
Regarding seat projections, the Prachachon Party is expected to receive the highest vote count with about 150 seats, followed by Bhumjaithai with approximately 120 seats, and Pheu Thai third with about 110 seats. Kla Party might rank fourth with around 50 seats, and Democrat Party fifth with about 30 seats. The remainder would be smaller parties like Palang Pracharath, Ruam Thai Sang Chart, Prachachat, and others, each likely securing around 8–10 seats.
Associate Professor Dr. Yutthaporn revealed that among the five formulas, Formula 1—cooperation between Bhumjaithai and Pheu Thai, supported by Kla and other parties, with Prachachon as opposition—is the most probable. He personally expects the three major parties—Prachachon, Bhumjaithai, and Pheu Thai—to have close vote counts, with gaps no greater than 40 seats, as a landslide victory with over 250 seats for any party is unlikely. Ultimately, their seat counts will be near 100 each.
For constituency-based MPs, Associate Professor Dr. Yutthaporn predicts votes will mainly flow to Bhumjaithai and Pheu Thai, as both prioritize fielding candidates in constituencies. Considering political family networks, Bhumjaithai has the most with 86 families affiliated, while Pheu Thai has about 70. This gives both parties a strong chance of winning many constituency seats. Although some parties might lose about 30% of their MPs, the overall seat distribution is unlikely to change significantly, possibly just shifting individual politicians or political networks.
Regarding party-list MPs, Prachachon is seen as advantaged due to its expertise in social media and its full digital party nature. This includes not only communication via social media but also online political activism, issue mobilization, and advocacy, all contributing to Prachachon's prominence in the party-list system.
On the issue of "party-switching politicians" ("snakes") potentially appearing in this election, Associate Professor Dr. Yutthaporn believes their impact will be insignificant. This is because overall vote counts are unlikely to be marginal. When seat counts are not close, parties with only one or two seats have little chance of such politicians emerging.
Large parties might have a higher chance of experiencing "party-switching politicians," but this is unlikely to have a meaningful political effect. Such shifts only matter when vote counts are marginal; if a party has a clear advantage, these movements have no practical significance.
On post-election party coalitions, Associate Professor Dr. Yutthaporn notes that the current election engineering maintains the status quo, as political rules have not changed, including the 2017 Constitution and the House of Representatives election law. He explains that election engineering creates two political mechanisms: one for the election itself and one for government formation, which are not directly connected. Thus, election results do not always reflect or determine government formation outcomes.
Looking back at elections under the 2017 Constitution, the party with the highest vote count has never formed the government. For example, in 2019, Pheu Thai had the most votes, but Palang Pracharath formed the government. In 2023, Move Forward Party had the highest votes, but Pheu Thai ultimately formed the government. Additionally, during transitions, Bhumjaithai, with about 60–70 MPs, became the minority government leader. These phenomena show election engineering is designed to separate "election results" from "government formation," remaining a key factor shaping Thai politics today.
The greatest concern beyond election results is the referendum, as the "trap of advance voting" could become a major obstacle, reducing voter turnout and potentially causing the referendum to fail.
Associate Professor Dr. Yutthaporn said the Election Commission (EC) should expedite facilitating advance voters. Currently, advance voters must vote twice—on 1 February 2026 and again on 8 February 2026—creating burdens and possibly hindering participation. Laws allow for alternative referendum methods, such as postal or electronic voting or other secure channels, but the EC has yet to issue regulations due to concerns about identity verification and risks of lost or delayed ballots. Nonetheless, these are management issues that can be improved, and efforts should focus on facilitating citizens to genuinely promote political participation.