Revealing the "Bhumjaithai" government formation formula after the 2026 election: three scholars analyze Anutin's premiership prospects, the likely coalition including "Kla Tham" and "Pheu Thai," and the high possibility of including smaller parties to strengthen the alliance.
Following the 8 Feb 2026 election, with unofficial results counted, the Bhumjaithai Party emerged as the winner, securing 193 seats. The People's Party won 118 seats, while Pheu Thai obtained 74 seats, positioning Anutin Charnvirakul, leader of Bhumjaithai, to prepare for forming a new government.
Thairath Online's special news team interviewed Associate Professor Dr. Yutthaporn Isarachai, an associate professor in political science at Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University, to analyze Bhumjaithai's direction and coalition strategies following their clear electoral lead. Dr. Yutthaporn identified three possible government formation formulas as follows.
Governing parties: Bhumjaithai Party, Pheu Thai Party, Kla Tham Party
Opposition parties: People's Party, Democrat Party
This formula is viewed as the most feasible for forming a government due to its relative stability. The main opposition parties, People's Party and Democrat Party, are considered "professional opposition" that systematically scrutinize the government rather than creating instability.
If this formula materializes, the parliamentary seats supporting the government could reach about 325, while the opposition, comprising People's Party, Democrat Party, and smaller parties, would likely hold no more than 140–150 seats combined.
However, if Pheu Thai decides to join the government, clear frameworks and boundaries must be set, especially on sensitive issues like the Senate vote-rigging case and the Khao Kradong case, where Pheu Thai and Bhumjaithai have previously had significant disagreements and debates.
Governing parties: Bhumjaithai Party, Kla Tham Party
Opposition parties: People's Party, Pheu Thai Party
This formula is less likely due to potential government management challenges, as it would rely heavily on many small parties, similar to Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha's government in 2019. If realized, it would have around 270 supporting seats.
An important point is that this formula would implicitly push Pheu Thai and People's Party to unite as opposition, despite their ongoing conflicts and mutual criticism at both party and supporter levels. They do share common stances on several issues, such as advocating for democracy.
From Bhumjaithai's perspective, this formula is likely undesired because People's Party is already an effective opposition; adding Pheu Thai could intensify pressure on the government in parliament.
Governing parties: Bhumjaithai Party, People's Party, Democrat Party
Opposition parties: Other smaller parties
This formula is seen more as a backup option than a realistic scenario, aiming to create a positive image for government formation and gain middle-class urban acceptance by including People's Party and Democrat Party in the government.
However, the risk lies in the coalition structure with two large parties together, which could lead to internal conflicts. If one party withdraws, the other might be unable to continue.
Furthermore, People's Party has clearly stated it will not support Anutin Charnvirakul or any candidate from Bhumjaithai, making this formula practically unlikely.
Meanwhile, Assistant Professor Dr. Wanwisit Boonprong, a political science lecturer at Rangsit University, analyzed Bhumjaithai's government formation direction and strategy, concluding that the easiest practical formula is to combine Bhumjaithai, Kla Tham, Palang Pracharath, Ruam Palang, and several small parties to surpass 270–280 seats, sufficient to form a government without excessive political cost.
This calculation excludes Pheu Thai due to ministerial seat allocation issues, especially as Bhumjaithai's numerous local power groups would complicate sharing positions with Pheu Thai, making acceptance by all parties difficult.
If Pheu Thai joins the government, the key ministry they would negotiate for is the Ministry of Transport, which Bhumjaithai views as a critical "strategic spear". Past collaboration showed both parties know each other's tactics well, so conceding this ministry could strengthen future opponents.
Conversely, letting Pheu Thai serve as opposition is a longer-term advantage for Bhumjaithai, as Pheu Thai's remaining local power groups may eventually seek new paths to expand influence, likely causing the party to gradually shrink.
At the same time, People's Party faces pressures from National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) indictments, affecting political morale and base significantly. Overall, the opposition may lack sufficient power to seriously destabilize the government, though oversight will continue.
As for the Democrat Party, choosing opposition status would be a crucial period for rebranding, restoring their image, and reevaluating their political role.
Although Bhumjaithai is the main government leader, internal challenges remain, particularly regarding the government's image. Recruiting only two to three technocrat or external ministers may be insufficient; one or two more may be needed to enhance appeal and government popularity.
Another key variable is the role of the "Commander Party," which holds about 58 seats, increasing bargaining power over ministerial seats and portfolios. If it can further consolidate small parties independently, it will significantly boost its influence within the government.
Considering the overall picture, it is likely that People's Party, Democrat Party, and Pheu Thai will serve as opposition, mainly because Bhumjaithai is already large enough. Bringing Pheu Thai's 300-plus seats into the government is unnecessary and risky, as an oversized government is harder to control and may cause long-term internal problems.
Associate Professor Dr. Thanapat Patchim, Dean of the Graduate School at Suan Dusit University, views the most probable government structure as a coalition of Pheu Thai, Kla Tham, and other small parties, led by Bhumjaithai, reflecting a continuation of the "old power bloc" rather than a new political power balance.
On the other side, if People's Party remains in opposition, the Democrat Party may also join them. If their combined seats are sufficient, there is no need to include more parties, since an oversized opposition can create long-term problems, a lesson from past experiences.
Therefore, government formation will likely involve a seat count that is not excessively large, with suitable government seats around 300 and not exceeding 320–325 to maintain balance and long-term stability.
In terms of legitimacy, Bhumjaithai clearly has an advantage as the top-vote party, facilitating smooth government formation. Conversely, if People's Party becomes the top party and Bhumjaithai second, government formation would be more complex due to possible political debts People's Party might claim from Bhumjaithai later.
Hence, an appropriate coalition size should be just over 300 seats but not exceed 350. Currently, no significant obstacles threaten government formation, and the existing numbers support a smooth process.
Regarding whether Pheu Thai might end up in opposition, Dr. Thanapat views it as "difficult but not impossible," since Thai politics can be unpredictable. However, given Pheu Thai's current 80–90 seats, there is little reason to push them into opposition.
Another important factor is the NACC indictments of 44 MPs. After indictment, cases move to court, and if accepted, status may resemble disqualification, reviewed by the Supreme Court's Criminal Division for Political Office Holders. The key variables are how many indicted MPs remain in the current parliament and whether appeals will be made. Appeals seem unlikely unless new issues arise. Attention remains on NACC's indictment level, as it could directly affect government stability.
Currently, People's Party is weak and declining, pressured by legal issues and criticized as an opposition that "talks more than acts," a vulnerability requiring caution.
Meanwhile, this is Bhumjaithai's time to play aggressively by continuously recruiting constituency MPs and local power groups, significantly increasing its MPs to nearly 200. This strategy clearly aims to "unite to block the Orange Party."
Lessons from past elections have led many political leaders to agree that allowing major parties to compete within provinces risks enhancing the Orange Party's growth.
For Pheu Thai, which scored under 100 seats, this is a critical lesson from losing many constituencies, along with political context, security, and leadership factors. The challenges faced by Paethongtarn have clearly affected the party's credibility and popularity.
Conversely, Kla Tham has become stronger due to its large base of constituency MPs and local power groups. Although its party-list popularity remains to be seen, in terms of bargaining power, Kla Tham is considered... (text cut off)