ASEAN's (in)energy security arises as the oil assistance mechanism for the 10 member countries—"complicated conditions, multiple steps, and not free"—renders it ineffective in crisis situations.
After the war erupted between the U.S., Israel, and Iran in the Middle East for just over a week, ASEAN foreign ministers convened a special online meeting to exchange views, assess the situation, and explore cooperative responses.
The chairman's statement at the meeting said: Philippines One key point was: “The meeting called for full utilization of ASEAN’s existing mechanisms and cooperation frameworks to enhance consultations, information exchange, and cooperation among ASEAN member countries. It emphasized that ASEAN already has practical mechanisms and initiatives available, which can be adapted and strengthened to boost the region’s resilience and capacity for response and recovery.”
Within ASEAN, three member countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei—are major oil and gas producers. Medium producers include Thailand, Vietnam, and Myanmar. The rest—Philippines, Cambodia, Laos, Singapore, and newcomer Timor-Leste—either do not produce or produce negligible amounts, relying almost entirely on imports.
Data from the latest ASEAN Center for Energy report released last December shows that ASEAN's crude oil production in 2024 remains fairly stable at about 1.48 million barrels per day, slightly down 0.12% from 2023. Conversely, natural gas production increased by 4.50% to 20.52 billion cubic feet per day from 19.64 billion cubic feet the previous year. This growth comes from capacity increases in several countries, especially the three main producers: Malaysia up 10.82%, Indonesia up 1.67%, and Thailand up 10.59%.
However, ASEAN's petroleum future looks less promising. Proven reserves in 2024 declined from 2023 levels: crude oil dropped 0.57% from 11.98 to 11.91 billion barrels (BBO), and natural gas fell 3.49% from 4.14 to 4.00 trillion cubic meters. Crude oil reserves have been decreasing since 2021, and in 2024 both oil and gas reserves declined simultaneously, reflecting aging production sites and limited new discoveries in the region.
ASEAN has several frameworks for energy cooperation. These include the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Petroleum Security, updated memorandums of understanding for the ASEAN Power Grid and Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline, as well as cooperation with sectoral agencies and industry stakeholders.
Theresa Lazaro, Philippines’ foreign minister and ASEAN chair, expressed strong hope that ASEAN would utilize the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Petroleum Security effectively during this period of oil shortages and high prices. As a country fully reliant on imported oil and gas, the Philippines wishes to advance the full implementation of this agreement during its chairmanship.
The ASEAN petroleum security agreement was first initiated in 1986, during the decade following the late 1970s oil crisis and the Iranian Islamic Revolution. However, the complexity of petroleum trade led ASEAN to review, amend, and improve this agreement multiple times, notably in 2009 and most recently in 2025.
Nonetheless, despite frequent energy challenges among ASEAN members, no country has yet effectively utilized the petroleum security agreement as originally intended, due to several reasons outlined below.
First, the conditions for utilization are quite complex and the criteria stringent. The agreement applies only in situations defined as a true crisis:
Second, there are structural operational issues due to lengthy procedures to access oil or gas under this agreement. In a shortage situation meeting the criteria, the requesting country must notify the ASEAN Council on Petroleum (ASCOPE) Secretariat, providing clear, verifiable data on the shortage and proving it has viable energy saving or alternative plans. The Secretariat then has 48 hours to verify the request (which may take longer if suspicions arise about stockpiling within member states).
Next, the request is submitted to the management committee for review, then to the governing board for approval. If approved, the Secretariat notifies the coordination units of member countries about which countries are willing to provide assistance under this scheme. If a country with oil stocks agrees to help, coordination with relevant private or state enterprises follows to negotiate commercial deals to supply the needed oil or gas. The Secretariat continues to monitor and coordinate to assess when the crisis in the requesting member has passed.
Third, the so-called assistance under the agreement is not a donation or free humanitarian aid. It is commercial transactions based on voluntary buyer-seller agreements that may take four forms:
In summary, considering the regional energy structure and member states' behavior during crises, most ASEAN members prioritize their national interests over regional collective benefits. In energy-sensitive situations affecting economic and political stability, governments are motivated to safeguard their own security first, through export controls, domestic reserves, or bilateral channels that offer quicker, more flexible responses.
A clear example is Thailand, which immediately restricted fuel exports to neighboring countries when the Middle East war broke out. It also banned oil exports to Cambodia as economic pressure during border clashes and suspended exports to Myanmar to pressure transnational crime networks. While these measures aim at security, they also reveal how energy is used politically rather than shared regionally.
These facts clearly show that despite multiple ASEAN energy cooperation frameworks, including the petroleum security agreement, in practice these serve more as symbols of cooperation and solidarity than as effective mechanisms in crises. Even if the agreement were designed for easier and faster access, the chance of achieving regional collective energy security remains limited, as members lack incentives to sacrifice short-term national gains for regional benefit.
In other words, ASEAN's energy unity exists mostly on paper and in diplomatic rhetoric, not in actual policy behavior. In an increasingly geopolitically uncertain world, this structure means ASEAN’s energy security is more a principle than a practical reality.