Thaksin Shinawatra will be released from prison on the morning of 11 May after being granted parole. Experts believe this will shake up the political landscape behind the scenes, as the Pheu Thai Party organizes its ranks and waits for the right moment. They also note that past experiences offer important lessons.
Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra will be released on parole from Klong Prem Central Prison on the morning of 11 May 2026. He will be required to wear an electronic monitoring bracelet (EM) and is prohibited from traveling abroad after being incarcerated for 7 months and 28 days.
Nearly every phase of Thaksin Shinawatra’s life since reaching the peak as prime minister, through the coup and subsequent exile abroad, has been closely followed. Even his most recent return to Thailand saw him as a behind-the-scenes political figure. Therefore, attention now turns to what role he will play after this release and whether he can help the Pheu Thai Party rise again as the country’s leading political party.
Regarding Thaksin Shinawatra’s role after his parole release, Dr. Satithorn Thananishichoti, a political science professor at Chulalongkorn University, analyzes that Thaksin will need to exercise considerable caution, even though legally there may be no explicit restrictions.
Strategically, "it is advisable to keep a low profile for now." The main reason is that currently, the Pheu Thai Party has no urgent need to rush because it holds a coalition government position with important ministries under its control.
Interestingly, when the government faces criticism, public sentiment often targets the Bhumjaithai Party. Therefore, Pheu Thai should use this time to quietly "accumulate goodwill" without making overt moves that might attract unwanted attention. Let “Ajarn Chen” handle frontline duties effectively, while also preparing for the next phase.
If Thaksin were to act immediately upon release, it could destabilize an otherwise smooth political situation, as the timing is not yet suitable for such moves.
Will Thaksin’s return cause internal party tremors? Dr. Satithorn observes that internal power shifts happen continuously. Even during his imprisonment, key party decisions—such as ministerial allocations or political appointments—often coincided with visits from his family members.
This indicates that the main decision-making power still rests at the "Chan House," with Thaksin as the central figure mediating between the Shinawatra family network and various power groups within the party.
Going forward, Thaksin’s role will be "behind the scenes," supporting “Ajarn Chen” or "Yossanan Wongsawat" to comfortably fulfill their roles as Deputy Prime Minister and minister without distractions. They can focus on showcasing policy achievements that surpass other coalition parties, while Thaksin manages internal party balance, handles dissenters, and prevents defections using his personal influence.
Regarding concerns that Pheu Thai might become a "puppet" of the Bhumjaithai Party or the Buriram political bloc, Dr. Satithorn explains that the reality is a division of work, clearly seen since the cabinet formation where ministries were allocated smoothly. Although Pheu Thai seemed disadvantaged at first, it ultimately controls key clusters, allowing it to pursue its agenda independently without following others.
For Pheu Thai members worried about not being Thaksin’s "favorites," Dr. Satithorn says this is normal. Currently, the party holds only 70 seats and controls important ministries, so it still depends on useful members. Removing someone is difficult unless that person is not in a key position or is not among the top choices for political appointments.
Dr. Satithorn believes Pheu Thai has a chance to become the number one party again but must maintain good timing. Thai politics is currently divided into three blocs: blue, red, and orange. Although the red bloc (Pheu Thai) appears smallest now, it benefits from being in the center and can attract votes from both blue and orange sides if rivals falter.
Pheu Thai needs to change its mindset—not to think like the largest party as before, but as a challenger aiming to climb back up. If Bhumjaithai mishandles governance or the orange bloc lacks concrete policies and relies on rhetoric, Pheu Thai must quickly highlight policy-driven politics to regain momentum and attract supporters. Crucially, Thaksin should not rush to make overt moves that could disadvantage the party as in the past. Past lessons must guide them, recognizing that Pheu Thai is not currently number one and should steadily build support until the next election.