Peace without a host: When Thai and Cambodian elites lack the political will to resolve issues. Although mechanisms are in place, they are not seriously utilized, ultimately causing lower-ranking soldiers and border villagers to bear the consequences.
The conflict between Thailand and Cambodia Whether regarding land or maritime borders, the conflict has not reached a dead end without solutions. In fact, both countries have comprehensive mechanisms for dispute resolution—bilateral, multilateral, and international—but what is missing is the political will to find mutually beneficial solutions.
Land border disputes There is a Joint Boundary Commission (JBC) tasked with surveying and marking boundaries. Security and situation control involve defense mechanisms such as the General Border Committee (GBC) and the Regional Border Committee (RBC). . Regarding maritime disputes, the resolution process follows the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The problem is why the political leadership of both countries refuses to seriously use these mechanisms. Why do governments allow prolonged conflicts lasting years, while border communities suffer from military clashes, closed checkpoints, stalled cross-border trade, and daily life uncertainties? It is believed that political leaders of both countries know how to resolve these issues but lack the political will to end them, because in many cases, prolonging disputes brings greater political benefits than resolving them swiftly. The term
"political will"
is often used to mean courage, sincerity, or vision of leaders, but in reality, political will depends mainly on calculations of political costs and benefits rather than solely on politicians' personal virtues.
If compromise risks leaders being accused of surrendering, ceding territory, or even betraying national interests, whereas a tough stance increases popularity, legitimizes government and military, or distracts from domestic issues, political leaders have little incentive to compromise. In other words, political gains often outweigh the welfare of citizens, especially remote border residents. Therefore, the Thai–Cambodian dispute becomes a political resource. Nationalist rhetoric about sovereignty, territorial integrity, national pride, and threats from neighbors easily inflames public sentiment more than explanations of maps, treaties, international law, or boundary surveys. When conflict is framed as patriotism, space for reasoned debate shrinks. Those advocating negotiation may be seen as weak; those questioning government or military information may be accused of disloyalty; and those explaining the other side’s perspective risk being viewed as siding with the enemy.
Another reason for prolonged conflict is that decision-makers are separate from those bearing consequences. Policymakers are in capitals, while displaced people live along borders. Officials closing checkpoints may gain political support, but those suffering lost income are border residents, traders, farmers, laborers, and small business owners. Military decision-makers may appear strong, but wounded or disabled soldiers and local civilians bear the human cost.
For those in the capitals,
border closures may be economic measures to pressure the other side, but for border people, closures mean loss of income, inability to trade, cut-off travel, and uncertainty about returning to normal life. As long as authorities do not factor in these costs, governments can continue harsh policies without feeling loss.
However, past Thai–Cambodian relations have sometimes been peaceful and cooperative, but this peace rested on personal ties between leaders, their political networks, and interest groups rather than stable, strong, and transparent rules.
Such peace may be called unsustainable peace. Although clashes may cease, the conditions for disputes remain. Elite relationships may maintain calm while interests align, but when personal ties change—as reflected in controversial phone call leaks—or when interests conflict or border issues are used politically, peace can quickly collapse. Personal relations may open negotiation channels but cannot replace institutions capable of continuous, effective work. If the JBC meets only when political relations are good but is suspended or stalled during public leader disputes, these mechanisms cannot build long-term confidence. Past mistakes include prioritizing short-term control over long-term solutions. When there is no gunfire, it is often assumed the conflict is controlled, yet disputes persist, with ongoing disagreements about maps and treaties and incomplete boundary surveys.
History is important to understand the origins of disputes, but often it is selectively presented to support one side’s narrative. Some events are emphasized while others omitted, turning historical facts into national narratives that divide the world into the righteous and aggressors, owners and usurpers.
Calls for historical empathy are important, but this does not mean fully accepting the other side’s narrative. It means understanding why people in the other country see events differently. Understanding the other’s context is not surrendering one’s position but a minimum condition for negotiation. If each side believes the other is unreasonable and only aggressive, there is no space for exchange of benefits.
Similar problems arise even in discussions on complex international law, where experts sometimes rely on emotions, beliefs, and biases more than clear understanding of how laws and processes work. Repeatedly asserting Thailand’s or Cambodia’s rights does not make the other’s claims disappear.
Maritime disputes
illustrate these problems clearly. When land disagreements are linked to maritime disputes, leading to rejection or cancellation of negotiation frameworks, even though land and maritime issues have different legal bases, processes, and interests.
Canceling negotiation frameworks without replacement may satisfy some politically in the short term but does not end disputes. On the contrary, it complicates management and allows processes less controlled by either side.
However, it should not be seen that compulsory mediation under UNCLOS is a tool for one side, just as insisting on bilateral talks alone does not guarantee solutions if talks lack timelines, continuity, or readiness to compromise.
Although Thailand and Cambodia have a ceasefire agreement (latest signed on 27 Dec 2025 GMT+7), it is only a first step to control violence and create space for political and diplomatic work. Without agreements on redeployment, incident investigations, communication between local units, and mutual complaint resolution, ceasefires remain fragile and gunfire may resume anytime. Both sides must manage problems on multiple levels: first, prevent clashes and protect civilians; second, implement risk reduction and build trust; third, continue boundary surveys and negotiations; and finally, foster economic and social cooperation that raises the cost of returning to force.
Trying to link all problems together creates chaos. Land disputes get tangled with maritime ones; technical work becomes tied to national pride; economic measures become punishment tools; and diplomatic talks turn into games, harming citizens of both countries.
Solutions must start by clearly separating issues: military matters limited to situation control; technical tasks handled by experts based on evidence; legal issues discussed frankly; and humanitarian problems addressed regardless of territorial claims.
In summary, what is needed today is to build political support for peace among border residents, entrepreneurs, workers, academics, media, and civil society, who have direct interests in open checkpoints, stability, and cross-border cooperation.
Security should not be limited to territorial control and troop deployment. Security for people means safe living, stable jobs and income, accessible schools and hospitals, and living without fear.