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China maintains a continuous military presence in Laos by establishing a joint support and training center near the capital to oversee southern border security and economic interests, emphasizing its ASEAN role and preserving the socialist regime's stability.
/ The opening of the China-Laos Joint Support and Training Center (China-Laos Joint Support and Training Center) and / the China-Laos Friendship Aviation Academy at Ban Keng, about 50 kilometers north of the capital Vientiane, marks a strategic security and military development that warrants close attention. However, it is still premature to conclude that China has established its first military base in Southeast Asia posing a threat to neighboring countries.
Satellite images reviewed by Reuters show that an area which until last year had only a dirt runway has rapidly developed since late 2025 into a large renovated runway with a parallel taxiway, apron, and several new buildings.
China's Ministry of Defense stated that establishing the joint support and training center and the aviation academy aims to help Laos enhance its Air Force pilot training capabilities, with both sides jointly managing their normal operations.
The statement said, “The construction and operation of the joint support and training center and aviation academy result from China and Laos adhering to mutual respect principles and conducting discussions on an equal footing, in accordance with the domestic laws of both countries and relevant international laws and practices, and are not directed against any third country.”
Military cooperation between China and Laos has a long history, including training, education, assistance, and equipment. However, the Ban Keng joint support center differs significantly as an institutionalized facility with permanent infrastructure on Laotian territory operated jointly. It is still too early to specify if it will develop into a Chinese military operational base, but strategically, it represents a persistent military presence of China in Laos.
This development stems from the close relationship between the two countries, which share similar political ideologies and governance systems. China and Laos established a “Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership” in 2009 and elevated political ties further in 2017 by agreeing to build a “China-Laos Community with a Shared Future and Strategic Meaning.”
Although the size and development levels of Laos and China differ greatly, making their partnership asymmetrical, this does not mean China is solely the benefactor while Laos only benefits. Both countries hold significant strategic importance to each other.
From Beijing's perspective, Laos is a small neighboring country with a shared border that holds several strategic interests for China.
Firstly, the security of China's southern border in Yunnan province, both overland and along the Mekong River, faces challenges such as drugs, transnational crime, scammers, and human trafficking, which also affect Yunnan. China seeks full cooperation from Laos to address these issues. Recently, China and Laos established a 3+3 Strategic Dialogue mechanism linking foreign affairs, defense, and public security to enforce laws and cooperate on cross-border crime suppression.
Secondly, economic interests, with total China-Laos trade reaching $9.82 billion last year, up 19.3% from the previous year. China's cumulative investment in Laos exceeds $18 billion, making China Laos' top foreign investor. Infrastructure like the China-Laos Railway increasingly connects Laos' economy with southern China. China's interests in security and stability in Laos grow alongside these economic ties, so expanding security and military cooperation builds on mutual economic reliance.
Thirdly, due to their shared geography, China strategically needs access to Laos’ territory and facilities. Such access does not necessarily mean building military bases, but close military-to-military ties and familiarity among commanders and personnel facilitate China's ability to operate in Laos when needed.
Fourthly, Laos’ strategic shift from a landlocked to a land-linked country is significant to China in physically connecting security and economic interests with other Southeast Asian countries, especially Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore, through land routes rather than sea.
Conversely, Laos does not merely depend on China or see it as exploiting Laos. Laos gains substantially from its strategic partnership with China. First, Laos has the opportunity to develop and modernize its limited-resource People's Army. Cooperation with China provides Laos with equipment, training, education, technology, military medicine, and essential infrastructure. Previously, Laos had to allocate budget or rely on foreign aid to send personnel abroad for training, but having this training center domestically facilitates internal development.
Second, economically, trade between China and Laos reached $9.82 billion last year, up 19.3%. Laos exported about $5.50 billion to China, increasing 20.7%, while importing $4.32 billion, up 17.6%, resulting in a trade surplus of approximately $1.18 billion for Laos, increasing foreign currency inflow. Chinese investment generates jobs, income, and supports Laos' development and growth. Many infrastructure projects, including roads, power dams, telecommunications, and communications, have benefited from Chinese investment. Laos’ rail transport system is now arguably more modern than Thailand’s, mainly due to Chinese investment.
Third, transnational crime, drugs, scammers, and human trafficking are not just China's issues but also pose security problems for Laos. Many Laotians fall victim to scams and trafficking. Security cooperation with China benefits both parties.
Fourth, ideological and regime stability interests, as Laos is one of five remaining Marxist-Leninist socialist countries after the Cold War, alongside China, Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba. Such special relations help uphold Laos' regime stability and progress.
Chinese President Xi Jinping refers to this relationship as “comrades plus brothers,” emphasizing during Laotian President Thongloun Sisoulith’s June visit to Beijing that they will jointly protect the socialist regimes and leading roles of the Communist Party of China and the Lao People's Revolutionary Party amid global turmoil.
However, this is not only about reciprocal benefits between a big and small neighboring country. China's continuous military presence in Laos carries regional security implications. The Ban Keng center is part of China's expanding military relations across several mainland Southeast Asian countries.
China already has military cooperation facilities in Cambodia at Ream Naval Base, long-standing arms and security ties with Myanmar's military, and is a major arms supplier to multiple regional militaries, including Thailand. China also regularly conducts joint exercises and military exchanges with Thailand. Thus, China's growing access to military facilities in Laos extends its role beyond arms sales and training partners to include military infrastructure access.
The significance lies not in China building a network of bases encircling any country—current evidence does not support this—but in China's increasing access to militaries, personnel, and facilities at multiple regional points, from Cambodia's maritime areas to Laos' interior, while maintaining military ties with Thailand and Myanmar. This development enhances China's influence in Southeast Asia's security landscape, though not yet creating an alliance system or base network centered on China.
For Thailand, the Ban Keng center is not an immediate high-level concern but should not be ignored. Thailand's response differs markedly from when China supplied T-59D tanks to Cambodia; Thai authorities have been cautious rather than alarmist. The Defense Ministry spokesman stated that permitting China to establish a base is Laos' sovereign right, but Thailand will monitor developments closely, particularly regarding mutual trust.
This stance reflects Thailand's unique position as both a U.S. treaty ally and a country with close military cooperation with China, while Laos shares long land and river borders with Thailand. Therefore, Thailand's challenge is not opposing China-Laos military cooperation but ensuring it is transparent and predictable enough not to undermine trust or Thailand's security environment.
In summary, the Ban Keng joint support and training center may not be a Chinese military base, nor does it necessarily need to evolve into one. Strategically, China does not require a base to access Laos' military spaces if strong ties, joint training, personnel, and infrastructure provide access when needed.
What remains to be seen is how many personnel or aircraft China will deploy there, what activities they will conduct, and whether cooperation will expand beyond pilot training. Only then can it be described as a continuous Chinese military presence in Laos with genuine regional security implications.