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Undesirable Outcomes in Thai-Myanmar Relations

Theissue08 Nov 2026 16:56 GMT+7

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Undesirable Outcomes in Thai-Myanmar Relations

Undesirable outcomes in Thai-Myanmar relations have arisen as the government softens its stance following its neighbor's approach, causing Thailand to shoulder problems of border fighting, cross-border pollution, and an unresolved migrant labor crisis.

The military operations aimed at crushing opposition forces and ethnic groups in Myanmar, which have affected Thai border districts in Mae Hong Son and Tak provinces, represent only one sign alerting Thai authorities that the policy direction toward recalibrating relations with Myanmar’s military-led (civilian facade) government has yet to achieve desired results.

After the Myanmar military (the Tatmadaw) launched airstrikes against bases of forces affiliated with the Karen National Union (KNU) in early November, damage occurred to homes and property of Thai civilians and government in Sob Moei District, Mae Hong Son, and Mae Sot District, Tak Province. Thai government representatives at various levels, from the Foreign Minister, National Security Council Secretary, to the Supreme Commander, formally expressed serious concern to their Myanmar counterparts about the impact on Thailand.

However, beyond these public diplomatic expressions, there have been no reports that the government or responsible agencies have taken further action to halt, alleviate damage, or prevent recurrence. This is despite the current Thai government recently pursuing policies aligned with the desires of the Naypyidaw government to reintegrate Min Aung Hlaing’s civilian government into the international arena, with hopes of achieving tangible cooperation to resolve the many complex bilateral issues existing between the countries. Thai-Myanmar problems span political, security, economic, trade, border security, cross-border pollution, and humanitarian issues related to refugees, migrants, and migrant labor, all requiring deep understanding and differentiated approaches. Regarding the immediate issue debated in Thai society now, several points merit consideration.

Border security and safety

Security officials, especially military personnel and experts, often misunderstand this issue, focusing mainly on sovereignty and territorial integrity. In reality, border security and safety can be clearly separated from sovereignty concerns because the fundamental problem is that Thai civilians are affected by fighting between the Tatmadaw and various opposition groups. In Mae Hong Son and Tak, this includes

the People’s Defense Force (PDF), Karenni forces, and notably the heavily engaged Karen forces within the Karen National Union, along with other Karen groups such as the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) and even border defense forces formerly allied with the Tatmadaw. Regardless of who fights whom, stray bullets, bombs, and rockets—whether from aircraft or long-range launchers—frequently fall across into Thai territory. Although the demarcation of the over 2,400-kilometer Thai-Myanmar border remains incomplete and unclear, it is generally understood that the Tatmadaw or allied forces do not intend to encroach upon or seize Thai land. Therefore, the Tatmadaw should not be regarded as an enemy or as seeking open conflict with Thailand.

Importantly, both sides can cooperate to ensure the safety of local populations through existing mechanisms, especially

the tripartite bilateral military mechanisms: the High Level Committee (HLC) chaired jointly by the supreme commanders of both sides, the Regional Border Committee (RBC) chaired jointly by regional military commanders, specifically the 3rd Army Area for Mae Hong Son and Tak, and the Township Border Committee (TBC), chaired locally by the commanders of the Ratchamanu Task Force (Tak) and Singhanat Task Force (Mae Hong Son) along with Tatmadaw commanders on the Myanmar side. In principle, commanders at these levels are already familiar with each other and often cultivate personal rapport to facilitate coordination and joint operations. It is feasible for them to consult, discuss, and establish joint measures to protect local communities.

In practice, field commanders and troops must also communicate with opposition and ethnic armed groups. The Tatmadaw may be suspicious of these relations, but Thai military commanders must clearly demonstrate neutrality without covertly aiding any side. All measures must prioritize protecting Thai citizens and interests.

Similarly, at the highest level (HLC), clear demands must be made of the Tatmadaw not only to implement safety measures for Thai people and property but also to take responsibility for damages caused. Otherwise, endless warnings or protests will continue to be ignored or met with vague apologies, leaving recurring problems unresolved and border populations suffering indefinitely.

Cross-border pollution issues

During Myanmar President Min Aung Hlaing’s official visit to Bangkok last August, Thailand and Myanmar signed a Terms of Reference (TOR)

for a joint working group on water quality management of border and transboundary rivers, establishing a cooperation mechanism to tackle river pollution affecting both countries. Since then, some progress has been made, but no concrete measures have emerged to control pollution at its source. Water quality in several northern Thai rivers remains contaminated beyond safe health standards. On 6 October, environmental officials from Myanmar’s eastern Shan State collected water samples from the Salween River near Tachileik, opposite Mae Sai District, Chiang Rai, and sent them for laboratory analysis in Taunggyi, the Shan State capital.

Local media reported sampling at six points, including the Salween near Doi To Kham Bridge upstream of the Thai-Myanmar border section, the Second Friendship Bridge, the Ruak River (a Salween tributary), the Ruak River mouth at the Golden Triangle, the Mekong River near the Ban Pong international port, and the confluence of major rivers in Tachileik. However, no results have yet been publicly released.

Thai communities along the Salween, Kok, Ruak, and Mekong rivers have suffered from toxic water pollution for years, linked to uncontrolled mining activities upstream in Shan State, including areas under the control of

the United Wa State Army (UWSA).

A key condition for effective resolution is clearly identifying which mines cause pollution and securing cooperation from authorities controlling mining areas. Myanmar authorities often claim they cannot access UWSA-controlled zones, and most investors are Chinese. Recent information, however, shows Myanmar officials maintain regular contact with UWSA leaders in Pang Sang, suggesting feasible options beyond mere water sampling. Thailand should not restrict cooperation to Myanmar alone but also engage UWSA, Chinese government and private sectors, and even Thai mineral traders to seriously address root causes and produce tangible results. Migrant labor issues from Myanmar These have reached a sensitive, near-crisis point due to strict nationality verification measures, remittance requirements, income taxes, and military conscription, combined with high procedural costs.

These factors may force over a million Myanmar workers to lose legal status, becoming undocumented, complicating Thailand’s labor management and potentially harming its economy.

Myanmar’s Ministry of Labor issued Notification No. 108/2024 in August 2024 requiring overseas workers to remit at least 25% of foreign-earned income to their families or personal bank accounts in Myanmar via authorized channels monthly or quarterly, and keep transfer proof for officials. Workers using licensed recruitment agencies must submit copies of such proof to the agencies.

Additionally, following 2023 tax law amendments, Myanmar’s embassy in Thailand requires workers to pay a 2% income tax. Workers earning 7,500 baht monthly pay 150 baht tax per month or 1,800 baht annually. Workers failing to comply with remittance rules may face restrictions on overseas work travel, Overseas Worker Identification Card (OWIC) issuance,

and passport renewals.

The current controversy, including protests and opposition by some Thai groups, arose when Thai authorities cooperated with Myanmar to open

five nationality verification and Certificate of Identity (CI) issuance centers, along with mobile service units in Thailand from 14 October 2026 to 14 January 2027, to serve workers needing documentation for visas and work permits. Experts familiar with these issues estimate that among up to 5 million Myanmar workers in Thailand, those facing documentation problems fall into three groups with differing conditions and obstacles:

The first group, about 700,000 people, were registered for work under the Cabinet resolution of 11 November 2025 but lack passports or identity certificates needed to complete visa and work permit applications. Although Myanmar authorities opened the five CI centers in Thailand, workers still face difficulties booking appointments and bear costs including 2,660 baht for CI, 1,800 baht income tax, and 3,000 baht visa fees, plus possible miscellaneous expenses such as broker fees reportedly 1,300–1,500 baht. Some need at least 10,000 baht to cover all steps, a heavy burden for those earning under 10,000 baht monthly. The second group, nearly 2 million people, fall under Cabinet resolutions of 24 September 2024 and 2 December 2025. Most already have ID documents but need to renew expired passports, requiring travel back to Myanmar. They bear travel and official costs and worry about forced military conscription and uncertain re-entry to Thailand.

Since February 2024, Myanmar’s compulsory military service law requires men aged 18–35 and women aged 18–27 to serve generally for two years, extendable in emergencies. UN human rights reports cite forced conscription cases, including Myanmar workers deported from neighboring countries like Thailand.

The third group, about 100,000 people, entered under the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) labor system and are due to complete four-year contracts in 2026–2027. Normally, they must return home for a specified period before re-entering Thailand. For this group, Thailand’s Department of Employment has discussed with Myanmar an MOU U-Turn process allowing contract completion workers whose employers wish to continue employment to stay without returning home. However, exemption does not guarantee automatic work continuation; all related procedures remain necessary, including workplace and employer inspections, passport validity checks, health exams, visa extensions, and work permit approvals. Thus, they remain at risk; any document issues require dealing with Myanmar authorities and facing the same conditions as others. Thailand and Myanmar signed labor cooperation and new labor employment agreements during President Min Aung Hlaing’s official visit to Thailand in August. Yet current problems reveal gaps between government agreements and workers’ ability to access affordable documentation processes, potentially affecting their safety.

Solutions remain unclear. Some propose abolishing Myanmar’s nationality verification, letting Thai authorities register workers instead. However, this would likely harm relations with Myanmar’s government, which would not easily forgo tax and remittance revenue or lose the ability to conscript workers employed in Thailand.

A feasible path is for Thailand to negotiate with Myanmar to amend the 2002 bilateral double taxation agreement to cover all migrant workers who already pay taxes or withholding in Thailand, requiring Myanmar to exempt them from further taxation. Thus, the 2% tax should not be a condition for nationality verification or passport renewal. Furthermore, remittance transfers should be voluntary, as Thailand imposes no compulsory remittance conditions on its citizens working in Myanmar, and Myanmar should not impose such terms for nationality verification or renewal of passports and identity cards.

In conclusion, there is no single ready-made solution for all Myanmar-related problems affecting Thailand. Above all, the current Thai government has invested in bringing Myanmar into the international arena and recalibrating engagement to jointly find solutions for all issues—not merely to address Myanmar’s problems alone while Thailand continues to bear these burdens out of deference.

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